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Sources: senior EU and US officials are concerned about China's accelerated push into the production of older-generation chips made with 28nm equipment or above

- China is building more plants than others despite US sanctions  — Officials are worried about impact on domestic chip plans

Bloomberg

Context & Ripple Effects

The US export-control regime was built around the leading edge: as early as 2018, export controls were flagged as the way to slow China's cutting-edge ambitions, and in 2022 the Commerce Department drew the line at 14nm, barring US equipment suppliers from fabs at that node or below. Legacy nodes like 28nm were left deliberately outside the fence. What changed is that China used the opening — equipment orders had already surged 58% YoY in 2021 — to build mature-node capacity at a pace no other country is matching, and senior EU and US officials now see that volume as a competitive threat to their own domestic chip programs.

The concern lands after a decade of Chinese frustration with substitution efforts, capped by anti-graft probes into top chip executives, and it precedes a domestic turn: Chinese industry associations later told companies US chips are "no longer safe or reliable". Legacy-chip dominance would give that import-substitution campaign a product to substitute with.

First-order effects

  • US and EU officials' own domestic fab plans now face a price competitor: China is building more mature-node plants than anyone else, so the 28nm-and-above chips that anchor autos and industrial gear get cheaper just as Western governments are subsidizing the same capacity at home.
  • The 14nm line drawn by the Commerce Department in 2022 is exposed as too narrow — it constrained advanced nodes while leaving the volume end of the market, where Chinese capacity is now accelerating, essentially uncontrolled.

Second-order effects

  • Foreign equipment makers face a squeeze from both ends: China's reported requirement that new capacity use at least 50% domestically made tools erodes their future order book, while reports of ASML DUV machines being retrofitted to push toward advanced chips give Washington a reason to tighten even legacy-equipment rules.
  • If Chinese legacy chips flood the market at below-market prices, the economics of newly subsidized US, EU, and Japanese mature-node fabs weaken — turning Western industrial policy into a subsidy race against Chinese scale rather than a hedge against it.

Third-order effects

  • The likely structural outcome is a bifurcated chip market: export controls cordon off the leading edge while China converts sanctioned-out scale into dominance in mature nodes, and the associations' 'not safe or reliable' campaign hardens that split into two parallel supply chains.
  • For export-control design, the pattern suggests node-based lines age badly — each threshold (14nm, and the 28nm gap now under review) invites capacity to migrate just below it, pushing regulators toward broader equipment- and tool-level controls rather than process-node cutoffs.

The trend: Export controls aimed at China's cutting-edge chipmaking are redirecting its capital into legacy-node scale and domestic substitution, turning a containment policy into a contest over the mature-chip market.

Discussion

  • @zschneeweiss Zoe Schneeweiss on x
    Europe and US are growing alarmed by China's rush into legacy chips https://www.bloomberg.com/... via @jendeben @ianmking @AlbertoNardelli [image]
  • @pelstrom Peter Elstrom on x
    Last year, the Biden administration imposed broad controls over China's ability to secure advanced semiconductors. Now US and Europe are growing alarmed at Beijing's enormous investments in older-generation chips. What to do? @jendeben @debbywuintaipei https://www.bloomberg.com/.…
  • @byron_wan Byron Wan on x
    “The amount of money that China is pouring into subsidizing what will be an excess capacity of mature chips and legacy chips — that's a problem that we need to be thinking about and working with our allies to get ahead of.” The US needs to act fast! https://www.bloomberg.com/...
  • @parismarx Paris Marx on x
    After restricting China's access to chips, the US and Europe are now shocked that China is accelerating its efforts to produce its own. Who could have predicted such a response? 🫠 https://www.bloomberg.com/...
  • @ulrichspeck Ulrich Speck on x
    “In June, Xing Haiming, China's ambassador in Seoul, publicly warned South Korea against “decoupling” from the Chinese economy under the influence of the US.” https://www.ft.com/...
  • @dunne_insights Michael Dunne on x
    “Beijing will only retaliate against you in places where it can replace you, and if it is in a position to replace you, it is going to go ahead and do that anyway,” https://www.ft.com/...
  • @edourdoo Eddie Du on x
    From semiconductors and electric vehicle batteries to biotech and telecoms, South Korean companies are crucial players in sectors critical to national security and industrial strategy in both Washington and Beijing. https://www.ft.com/... [image]
  • @alansmithee1987 Alan Smithee on x
    South Korea exported more goods to the US than to China in 2022, for the first time since 2004. Also striking: how similar the two major surges (2009-11 to China; 2020-2 to US) look like, as if someone shifted the sluice gates https://www.ft.com/... [image]
  • @crsdavies Christian Davies on x
    Korean economists, officials, and company executives all note that whether Beijing likes it or not, South Korea has already embarked on an unmistakable — albeit untrumpeted — pivot away from the Chinese economy. My latest Big Read for the FT: https://www.ft.com/...
  • @financialtimes @financialtimes on x
    South Korea's chips and batteries are vital to Washington's and Beijing's national security and industrial strategy, but officials and companies say Seoul has already started a quiet pivot away from China. https://www.ft.com/... [image]