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TEXXR

Chronicles

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Sources: President Biden plans to sign an executive order to limit US investments in semiconductors, AI, and quantum computing in China by mid-August

Jenny Leonard / Bloomberg :

Bloomberg Jenny Leonard

Context & Ripple Effects

This is the deadline report in a year-long arc: the investment-control idea was first floated in September 2022, the program's preparation surfaced in March, and April reporting put an executive order 'in the coming weeks' — now sources give a mid-August target. The mechanism has narrowed from a broad sectoral ban to outbound investment screening in three named fields: semiconductors, AI, and quantum.

The move lands alongside China's own hardening, per the related coverage: an undocumented rule pushing chipmakers toward at least 50% domestically made equipment for new capacity, retrofitting of older ASML DUV lithography machines to sidestep export controls, and three state-backed venture funds of over $7.1 billion each aimed at early-stage hard-tech startups. Capital restrictions are becoming reciprocal.

First-order effects

  • US venture, private-equity, and corporate investors with China pipelines in chips, AI, or quantum would face notification or outright prohibition on new deals, forcing live term sheets in those sectors to be restructured or dropped.
  • Chinese startups in the three covered fields lose access to US capital exactly as Beijing's new state VC funds are positioned to backfill early-stage hard-tech rounds.

Second-order effects

  • China's counter-levers accelerate: the domestic-equipment quota and DUV retrofitting efforts become the fallback path for advanced capacity as US money and US-origin tooling both tighten, deepening reliance on ASML workarounds.
  • US investors redirect capital toward non-Chinese semiconductor, AI, and quantum targets, bidding up alternatives in allied markets while Chinese funds consolidate domestic deal flow.

Third-order effects

  • If outbound investment screening becomes routine alongside export controls, the two tech ecosystems develop parallel capital markets — state-directed funding in China, policy-screened private capital in the US — and cross-border tech investing becomes a compliance discipline rather than a market decision.

The trend: The US is extending its China tech containment from export controls to outbound capital, completing a two-front screening regime for semiconductors, AI, and quantum.

Discussion

  • @orlovprovince @orlovprovince on x
    China, I hope it was worth it bringing over Yellen, Kerry, and Blinken instead of ignoring them like you should have.
  • @jendeben Jenny Leonard on x
    New: @POTUS is planning to sign an executive order to limit critical US tech investments in China by mid-August. Target is second week of August. Internal discussions now focused on rollout. Order won't take effect until 2024 after lengthy comment period. https://www.bloomberg.co…
  • @levie Aaron Levie on x
    We could also fix our immigration system [image]