Malaysia plans to allow carriers to decide whether to work with Huawei and other Chinese firms in its second 5G network, but will consider EU and US concerns
Anisah Shukry / Bloomberg :
Context & Ripple Effects
Malaysia's move follows a year of direct pressure: in May, the US and EU sent letters warning Kuala Lumpur over national security and foreign-investment risks if Huawei gained a role in its networks. The carrier-choice framing echoes earlier precedents — Washington has run an allied-avoidance campaign since 2018 asking partners to shun Chinese telecom gear, while Germany chose to permit Huawei's 5G technology after receiving safety assurances from the company itself.
The decision matters because Malaysia keeps straddling both blocs: two years later it would downplay a deal to build an AI system on thousands of Huawei chips, underscoring the same delicate position in the US-China tech race. Handing the choice to carriers shifts the geopolitical question from a government ban-or-permit decision to a procurement one.
First-order effects
- Malaysian carriers gain the authority to source second-network equipment from Huawei and other Chinese vendors without a state mandate — their vendor shortlists become the de facto policy.
Second-order effects
- The EU and US must now lobby individual Malaysian operators rather than the government, repeating at carrier level the assurance-based persuasion Germany accepted for Huawei's 5G gear.
Third-order effects
- If middle-power governments keep delegating vendor choices to operators while 'considering' Western concerns, 5G supply chains fragment market-by-market instead of splitting along bloc lines — a structure that later let Malaysia pursue Huawei-based AI infrastructure alongside Western ties.
The trend: Middle powers are converting US-China technology disputes from government bans into operator-level procurement decisions, preserving access to Chinese vendors while managing Western pressure.