Apple touts an Analysis Group study saying its App Store ecosystem generated $1.1T in 2022, up 29% YoY; $910B came from the sale of physical goods and services
The $910B attributed to physical goods and services is important because it emphasizes transactions enabled by apps that do not necessarily produce an App Store commission. That distinction broadens the store’s economic case beyond its directly monetized digital-sales business.
First-order effects
Apple gains a larger headline measure of the App Store’s ecosystem role, while developers and merchants can point to the platform as a channel supporting both digital and offline-linked commerce.
The estimate separates the ecosystem’s $1.1T activity from Apple’s own store revenue: physical goods and services account for most of the reported total, limiting what can be inferred about Apple’s direct take.
Second-order effects
The framing raises the stakes for App Store policy debates: developers and regulators assessing platform fees must distinguish commissionable transactions from the wider commerce the store helps facilitate.
Rival mobile platforms and app-distribution channels have added incentive to document their own downstream merchant and developer impact, not just app-store sales.
Third-order effects
If ecosystem-scale metrics become the standard defense of app marketplaces, platform competition will increasingly turn on how much value a gatekeeper enables versus how much control and monetization it retains.
The recurring use of commissioned ecosystem studies suggests that platform economics will be debated through competing definitions of billings, facilitated commerce, and direct revenue—not a single universal measure.
The trend: Mobile app stores are being positioned less as standalone digital storefronts and more as infrastructure for a broader merchant and developer economy.
Apple should stop blocking competing stores and payment processors so it can add this 30% tax to digital transactions between developers and developers' customers. The App Tax serves no productive purpose and just inflates prices. https://www.bloomberg.com/...
4. The biggest surprise was the billings from physical goods account for 60% of the $1.1T App Store billings. These include in app commerce (excluding Amazon), Uber, Airbnb, etc.
Apple has been beating the “most developers don't pay commissions” drum a lot since the Epic trial, but anytime I see this argument it reminds me how unfair it is (in some ways, not all), that I've personally paid them ~$1M and @Uber, @Airbnb, etc pay them just $100/yr. https://t…
2. Apple collected a take rate on only 10% of the billings. I estimate about 35% of Services revenue is from the App Store or about $27B in FY22. This means the App Store's effective take rate is about 2.5%, below the advertised 15% or 30% rates.
@clarky07 ... I haven't come up with a better solution, Apple's right that commissions on IAP are a convenient way tax the platform. IAP are often for zero or near-zero marginal cost goods and services. But that's not always the case and we've likely missed out on a lot of innova…
5. China is huge. Of the $1.1T, 46% came from China physical goods, 2% from China digital goods and 2% from China in-app ads. The reason is Chinese consumers have adopted in-app commerce at a rate of 3x faster than in the US.
Apple's App Store economic activity is estimated at $1.1 trillion in 2022. A 29% increase (after a 27% increase the year before.) Run rate is $916 per iOS user. 90% of this is does not create revenue for Apple.
3. I believe Apple makes most of the App Store revenue from digital goods with billings of $104B. If all of the App Store revenue was from digital goods (which its not) the effective take rate would be 26%.
Five takeaways from the study: 1. The study is a holistic view to App Store economy and strengthens Apple's case with developers and lawmakers before WWDC that Apple takes a lot less money than many think. This should slow efforts by lawmakers to reduce Apple's take rate.