WhatsApp and other encrypted messaging apps sign a letter urging the UK government to rethink the Online Safety Bill, which would weaken privacy on the internet
Encrypted messaging services have jointly called for changes to parts of the UK Online Safety Bill (OSB).
BBC
Context & Ripple Effects
The intervention extends WhatsApp’s earlier warning that weakening encryption in the bill could set a precedent beyond the UK, made by its chief in a prior warning to UK ministers. It turns a provider-specific objection into a coordinated position among encrypted messaging services.
The dispute subsequently drew Apple into the same push to protect encryption in the bill, as covered in Apple’s call for amendments. That broadens the issue from a WhatsApp policy concern into a test of whether safety rules can be applied without requiring access to private communications.
First-order effects
The UK government faces a unified, public challenge from encrypted messaging providers over bill provisions they say threaten privacy.
WhatsApp and its peers formally tie their product-security stance to changes in the legislation, raising the stakes for their UK operations and user trust.
Second-order effects
The coalition gives other major platform and device makers a clearer basis to oppose measures that would require message scanning; Apple later took that position publicly.
The debate shifts pressure onto policymakers to show how child-safety enforcement can coexist with end-to-end encryption, rather than treating privacy as a separate product choice.
Third-order effects
If governments increasingly condition platform access on scanning private messages, encryption providers may face a recurring choice between jurisdiction-specific compliance and a consistent global security model.
The UK’s approach could become a wider precedent for digital-safety regulation: the durable fault line is whether enforcement obligations can be designed without creating systemic access to private communications.
The trend: Online-safety regulation is increasingly colliding with end-to-end encryption as governments seek platform accountability without accepting provider blindness to private content.
Our position remains clear. We will not back down on providing private, safe communications. Today, we join with other encrypted messengers pushing back on the UK's flawed Online Safety Bill. https://twitter.com/...
WhatsApp Raises Concerns Over UK Government's Plan to Break End-to-End Encryption! The proposed law could undermine privacy and security, compromising the ability of billions of people around the world to communicate securely. https://blog.whatsapp.com/... https://twitter.com/...
Private messages are private. We oppose proposals to scan people's private messages, and we're proud to stand with other apps to defend encryption and your right to privacy. https://blog.whatsapp.com/...
... all the big tech firms I have spoken to, both on and off the record, oppose the UK government's proposal that encrypted messages should be accessed to root out child abuse and other illegal activity being shared...
End-to-end encryption means only the device which sends a message and the device which receives it can decypher it. It is both a bane of law enforcement and a vital tool for privacy campaigners and activists... https://www.bbc.com/...
Encryption doesn't mean encryption — it means privacy, safety and security. These things will all be undermined by the UKs proposed “Online Safety Bill”. We're fighting alongside our privacy tech allies against this assault on the rights of UK citizens. https://www.bbc.com/...
Over the weekend @session_app signed an open letter, alongside Signal, WhatsApp, Threema, Wire, Viber, and Element, to propose some changes to the UK's Online Safety Bill. The world doesn't need more surveillance. We're working together to prevent it. https://www.bbc.com/...
The #UK is pushing a badly written bill that may break your ability to stay safe & private. And mine. And most of us aren't even UK citizens. An un-forced embarrassment from the leaders of a country going astray on so many fronts. https://twitter.com/...
If the government needs to break encryption for an investigation, they can use an 0-day on the target. Requiring intercept features only hurts legitimate users *when* (not if) the flaws are found. Cryptography that cannot be broken by governments is trivially obtained. https://tw…
We're part of an open letter asking the UK government to rethink the Online Safety Bill to protect end-to-end encryption and respect privacy. Read the letter here: https://element.io/...
E2E IS privacy. The U.K. Gov is basically asking E2E services be weakened. This would place the U.K. in a very exclusive club of countries. None of which are aspirational for privacy & human rights. This is a fight infosec has to have. Don't be quiet on this. Too much is at stake…
Those pushing the Online Safety Bill need to understand just how serious providers of our secure messengers are about not doing as it mandates. https://twitter.com/...