SIA says chip companies proposed 40+ projects across the US worth ~$200B since 2020, as the US realizes that chips are now as central to modern economies as oil
Wall Street Journal : Tweets: @caitleg , @greg_ip , and @jchengwsj Tweets: Caitlin Legacki / @caitleg : Extremely thorough look at the importance of CHIPS over the next 50 years, including how @SecRaimondo is pulling every available lever to ensure our domestic industry succeeds. https://www.wsj.com/... https://twitter.com/... Greg Ip / @greg_ip : Semiconductors are the new oil & the U.S. is spending billions to secure the supply. It will be way more complicated than securing the supply of oil. “There's no doubt it's a very ambitious set of objectives,” says @mikereedschmidt. @asafitch and I report. https://www.wsj.com/... Jonathan Cheng / @jchengwsj : Many were blindsided last July when a research firm reported that China's largest chip maker had begun to manufacture 7-nanometer chips. With little warning, the U.S. installed the broadest-ever restrictions on chip exports to China. @asafitch @greg_ip https://www.wsj.com/...
Context & Ripple Effects
The SIA's tally is the scoreboard for a race that began with White House talks to bring Intel and TSMC fabs onshore in 2020 and was formalized by the CHIPS Act's passage alongside rival commitments — China's ~$150B through 2030, South Korea's $260B, the EU's $40B. Forty-plus proposed US projects worth roughly $200B since 2020 is what that subsidy wave has pulled in so far.
The framing matters as much as the number: Greg Ip's piece argues semiconductors are the new oil, and Commerce Secretary Raimondo is pulling every lever to make domestic capacity stick. That puts this in the same arc as chipmakers racing to capitalize on Western subsidies and China's counter-strategy of mastering basic, high-demand chips like microcontrollers and power chips.
First-order effects
- Chipmakers with proposed US projects are now positioned to claim CHIPS Act money, while Commerce under Raimondo decides which of the 40+ proposals actually get funded — the $200B is announced intent, not built capacity.
- The US joins a subsidy contest it can no longer sit out: China, South Korea, and the EU have each put national chip-investment programs on the table, so the SIA figure functions as proof the CHIPS Act is drawing commitments rather than a final count.
Second-order effects
- China's equipment buying accelerates in response — orders for chipmaking gear rose 58% YoY in 2021 with some US chipmakers claiming Chinese firms paid above-market prices — and Beijing pushes self-sufficiency via a reported rule requiring at least 50% domestically made equipment for new capacity.
- Export controls face a stress test: sources report China is retrofitting older ASML DUV lithography machines to produce advanced smartphone and AI chips, which would expose cracks in US-led restrictions meant to cap China's access to leading-edge capability.
Third-order effects
- If chips are treated as the new oil, industrial policy becomes the permanent operating model: fab locations are set by subsidy packages rather than pure cost logic, and every major bloc maintains a standing national semiconductor program.
- The control regime shifts from blocking specific machines to policing workarounds — retrofitting legacy tools and building out mature-node capacity — meaning the strategic contest moves down the stack to basic chips and equipment, not just cutting-edge nodes.
The trend: Semiconductors are being repositioned from a traded commodity to a state-secured strategic input, with subsidy competition among the US, China, South Korea, and the EU now determining where chip capacity gets built.