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Center for Technology & Statecraft: Chinese fabs had acquired ~343 DUVi tools by early 2026, with ~270 from ASML; DUVi can be adapted to make 7nm chips and HBM

DUV tools, though not as advanced as EUV, can be adapted to manufacture 7-nm logic chips and advanced memory for AI processors, report says.

South China Morning Post Howard Liu

Context & Ripple Effects

China’s DUV push had already progressed from a 2024 directive favoring improved domestic lithography to SMIC’s testing of a domestically produced DUV machine and reports that a state-backed company had begun manufacturing DUV systems in July 2026. Fabs were also reported retrofitting older ASML machines for advanced chips.

The reported tool base places those domestic efforts alongside a substantial installed fleet, rather than leaving advanced-chip production dependent solely on new domestic equipment or EUV.

First-order effects

  • Chinese fabs can use their installed DUVi systems for 7nm logic and HBM production processes, extending the range of AI-chip components they can pursue without EUV.
  • ASML’s roughly 270-tool share makes its installed base a material input to Chinese fabs’ advanced-node and memory ambitions.

Second-order effects

  • Export-control debates shift from the availability of EUV alone to whether continuing access to DUV immersion tools and their support preserves advanced-chip manufacturing capability.
  • China’s domestic DUV suppliers enter a market where fabs already have experience adapting and operating foreign DUV systems, raising the value of compatibility with existing process flows.

Third-order effects

  • If domestic DUV production matures, China’s lithography resilience will rest on both an installed foreign-tool base and local replacement capacity, making tool-by-tool restrictions less decisive on their own.
  • The ability to adapt DUV for both logic and HBM ties lithography policy more directly to the full AI hardware supply chain, not only to leading-edge processors.

The trend: AI hardware competition is broadening from restrictions on the most advanced lithography to control of the mature-tool installed base and the memory supply needed for AI systems.

Discussion

  • @konstantinpilz Konstantin F. Pilz on x
    America is squandering its key advantage in AI competition. Since 2023, China has imported than 250 DUVi machines — technology that China needs to make domestic AI chips like Huawei's Ascend 950. While we've been cutting China off from importing AI chips directly we're still send…
  • @nchlsbrwn Nicholas Brown on x
    While AI chip exports get more attention, whether China can continue to import ASML's DUV immersion (DUVi) lithography machines will be the decisive factor in US-China AI competition over the next decade. @techstatecraft has published a 30,000-word report that models how continue…
  • @fiiiiiist Tim Fist on x
    One simple policy change would massively alter the US-China AI competition: a China-wide ban on all DUV-immersion lithography machine exports. This is the difference between a persistent 10x advantage in US AI chip production and China potentially catching up.
  • @arthurctellis Arthur Tellis on x
    The PRC intends to indigenize logic/memory/SME manufacture to limit its exposure to US-influenceable supply chains. They'll succeed, but we can affect the speed with which they achieve that goal as well as their total chip manufacture today by restricting DUV export to China. The…
  • @anton_d_leicht Anton Leicht on x
    It's in both the American and the European strategic interest to stop ASML's DUVi exports to China. But right now, Americans feel like they have no choice but to beat the Dutch into submission. That makes for a volatile standoff, and it could backfire on both sides: (1) The propo…
  • @hamish_low5 Hamish Low on x
    New forecast of China's lithography indigenization progress! It reaches a similar estimate of the historical base rate as the forecast I co-authored with @AI_Futures_, placing DUV immersion indigenization, based on the historical trajectory, in the mid 2030s 🧵
  • @khansaifm Saif M. Khan on x
    ASML's DUV immersion (DUVi) tools are the most important tools Chinese chipmakers like Huawei need to make AI chips, and China won't commercialize their indigenous versions at scale until well into the 2030s. But current export controls only ban the most advanced versions China-w…
  • @techstatecraft @techstatecraft on x
    How many AI chips will China be able to make over the next ten years? One decisive factor is whether USG continues to allow China to import DUVi lithography tools. @nchlsbrwn and @KhanSaifM developed a model of Chinese chip production and found that DUVi is the most serious looph…
  • @zephyr_z9 @zephyr_z9 on x
    “𝗖𝗵𝗶𝗻𝗮 𝗻𝗲𝗲𝗱𝘀 …