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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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An interview with Paragon Solutions CEO Andrew Boyd, who says the US spyware maker cannot see customers' targeting information and doesn't have a “kill switch”

Wired Kim Zetter

Context & Ripple Effects

Paragon entered public view as an Israeli surveillance startup associated with tools that could reach encrypted messaging apps. A 2025 examination of Graphite and its suspected deployments put the company’s capabilities and customer use under sharper scrutiny.

The interview lands within a broader US effort to favor spyware suppliers aligned with US and allied buyers. Boyd’s account defines the limits of Paragon’s claimed oversight: the company says it lacks both targeting visibility and a direct mechanism to disable a customer’s tool.

First-order effects

  • Paragon’s customers retain control over targeting and continued use of Graphite, while the vendor says it cannot independently inspect those choices or directly shut down the product.
  • The company’s responsible-use positioning is narrowed to the controls it can actually exercise; public discussion noted that it can withhold support and unspecified updates, not compel access to customer activity logs.

Second-order effects

  • Government buyers assessing vendor safeguards must distinguish between contractual or technical audit rights and a supplier’s stated inability to see targeting data or deactivate a deployment.
  • Paragon is more directly exposed to comparisons with NSO Group’s customer-log requirements, which observers cited as a stronger mechanism for investigating alleged misuse.

Third-order effects

  • As governments steer procurement toward politically aligned spyware vendors, accountability claims are likely to be judged by enforceable access, audit, and suspension powers rather than vendor ownership or stated intent alone.
  • The episode points to a structural tension in commercial spyware: customer secrecy can be integral to the product while limiting a supplier’s capacity to police abuse.

The trend: The spyware market is shifting toward state-compatible suppliers, but procurement alignment does not by itself establish operational oversight of how customers use surveillance tools.

Discussion

  • @kimzetter Kim Zetter on x
    It can cut off 24/7 customer support as well as unspecified “updates” that customers need to use the tools, though it's not clear exactly how long after doing this a customer's use of the tools will be rendered ineffective
  • @kimzetter Kim Zetter on x
    Though customers can configure some of tools to log activity, Paragon can't force customers to hand over those logs if allegations of misuse arise - unlike NSO Group, which contractually requires this. Nor does Paragon have a kill switch to cut off customer use if misuse occurs
  • @kimzetter Kim Zetter on x
    The company, which was bought by a US equities firm in 2024 to bypass guardrails preventing US gov from purchasing foreign-made spyware, has no ability to investigate alleged customer abuses of its spyware. Its spyware does not by default log customer activity to catch abuse...
  • @kimzetter Kim Zetter on x
    Exclusive: Israeli spyware maker Paragon positioned itself as being more responsible than competitor NSO Group. But in a candid interview the company's new US CEO reveals the limits of their promise to keep bad actors from abusing their powerful spy tools https://www.wired.com/..…
  • @niaolainf Fionnuala NÍ Aoláin KC on bluesky
    “Yet weeks after Paragon, then Israeli-owned ... WhatsApp alleged that Paragon's Graphite spyware was used to infect the phones of more than 60 individuals in more than 20 countries, including journalists and activists.”  —  www.wired.com/story/the-se...