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EU regulators set to charge Microsoft over breached deal

(Reuters) - EU regulators are preparing to charge Microsoft Corp for failing to comply with a 2009 ruling ordering it to offer users a choice of web browsers, the EU's antitrust chief said on Thursday.

Reuters Karolina Slowikowska

Context & Ripple Effects

The browser-choice dispute had already moved from a July EU probe into Microsoft’s browser-choice compliance to reports that the Commission was weighing a complaint. Microsoft then said it would meet the EU’s browser-related antitrust requests, making the alleged breach a test of that undertaking rather than a new theory of harm.

The case also extends a long-running EU competition conflict with Microsoft, following the earlier EU case against the company. Its significance lies in whether negotiated remedies are enforced as rigorously as initial antitrust findings.

First-order effects

  • Microsoft must prepare to answer prospective EU antitrust charges over its failure to deliver the required browser-choice option to users.
  • EU regulators put Microsoft’s 2009 commitments under formal enforcement scrutiny, rather than treating the company’s pledge to address browser requests as sufficient.

Second-order effects

  • Companies negotiating commitments with EU competition authorities face a clearer incentive to treat implementation and user-facing delivery as compliance obligations, not merely settlement terms.
  • Browser makers seeking access to Windows users have a stronger basis to press for remedies that are monitored at the point where users make their browser selection.

Third-order effects

  • If the Commission pursues non-compliance cases consistently, EU antitrust remedies will be defined increasingly by whether users can exercise a choice in practice, not simply by whether a company accepts an obligation on paper.

The trend: EU competition enforcement is placing greater weight on the practical implementation of behavioral remedies, especially where platform design shapes user choice.