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Chronicles

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Google ups ante in online video gold rush

JAN. 6 7:01 P.M. ET Google Inc. is upping the ante in the online video gold rush, allowing content owners to set their own prices in a bid to create a more flexible alternative to Apple Computer Inc.'s pioneering iTunes store.

Associated Press May Wong

Context & Ripple Effects

Apple's iTunes had reached 1 million video-file downloads in 20 days by November 2005, establishing a visible early market for paid downloads. Google's planned video-download service and companion software positioned it as a direct alternative rather than a mere search distributor.

Google's decision to let rights holders set prices makes the competitive distinction concrete: licensors, not the store operator alone, can tailor the price of their video catalogues.

First-order effects

  • Content owners gain direct control over the prices charged for video sold through Google, allowing different catalogues to be priced independently.
  • Apple's iTunes faces a rival store model built around greater pricing discretion for the studios and other rights holders supplying video.

Second-order effects

  • Rights holders can use price flexibility to test whether Google's store delivers better economics than iTunes, increasing their leverage in negotiations with both distributors.
  • Google must persuade catalog owners that its download service and software offer enough reach and control to justify listing alongside or instead of Apple's store.

Third-order effects

  • Online video distribution is beginning to compete on the terms offered to rights holders, not only on consumer download volume; platforms that control customer access will be pressed to share more commercial control with suppliers.

The trend: Paid online video is developing into a contest between tightly managed storefronts and distribution services that give content owners more control over pricing.