It's a Core Location Blacklist
Yesterday I linked to a story about the discovery by Jonathan Zdziarski of a remote blacklist Apple is maintaining, supposedly, according to Zdziarski, to remotely disable rogue iPhone apps previously distributed through the App Store.
Context & Ripple Effects
A 2007 report had already raised the prospect of Apple blacklisting hacked iPhones. On August 6, Apple said it could remotely deactivate malicious signed App Store applications, making the reported blacklist a question of how that authority is implemented rather than whether Apple has a post-installation control mechanism.
That capability turns App Store governance into an ongoing relationship: Apple can act against software after distribution, while developers and iPhone owners depend on Apple’s determination that an app is malicious.
First-order effects
- Apple can deactivate a malicious signed App Store app remotely, giving it a direct response path after an app reaches iPhones.
- iPhone developers face enforcement beyond initial App Store approval, because software judged malicious can be disabled after installation.
Second-order effects
- App Store review becomes only one layer of compliance; developers must account for Apple’s continuing authority over distributed software.
- iPhone owners gain a platform-level remedy for malicious apps, but Apple’s decision-making becomes the gatekeeper for whether installed software continues to run.
Third-order effects
- If Apple applies remote deactivation broadly, the iPhone software ecosystem shifts toward continuous platform governance, with post-approval control concentrated in Apple rather than developers or device owners.
The trend: Mobile software distribution is moving from one-time storefront screening toward continuous platform-level enforcement after installation.