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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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How Internet Providers Get Around War Zones

Internet disruptions wreak havoc on global economies.  Avoiding them is dangerous, but lucrative.  —  Via dyn.com  —  In January 2008, something sharp — mostly likely an errant ship anchor — sliced into two underwater cables …

BuzzFeed Joseph Bernstein

Context & Ripple Effects

This piece extends an old thread of internet-fragility reporting: when two undersea cables were severed in January 2008 — most likely by an errant ship anchor — traffic across the region collapsed and coverage like Threat Level's Cable Cut Fever framed single-point failure as a systemic risk. Six years on, BuzzFeed, drawing on Dyn Research's analysis amplified by Jim Cowie, shifts the frame from accidental cuts to deliberate human hazards: war zones where providers still choose to operate.

What makes the story notable is the economics it surfaces — disruption wrecks economies at scale, so keeping packets moving through dangerous territory commands lucrative premiums. The syndication trail is thin (essentially Cowie's own amplification), suggesting this sat inside the network-measurement community more than the mainstream.

First-order effects

  • Internet providers running connectivity through conflict zones capture high-margin business from enterprises that cannot tolerate outages, while absorbing physical risk their land-based rivals avoid.
  • Customers in disrupted regions face immediate cost trade-offs: pay for circuitous, hardened routes or accept the economic damage of disconnection.

Second-order effects

  • Carriers whose paths bypass hazardous corridors gain bargaining power over those that cannot, pushing reroute and capacity pricing up along the safe alternatives.
  • Demand for rapid cable-repair capability grows, making repair ships and spare capacity strategic assets rather than back-office maintenance.

Third-order effects

  • If conflict-zone operation stays profitable, providers will keep building redundancy around fragile corridors — treating subsea infrastructure less as shared plumbing and more as competitive, risk-priced infrastructure.

The trend: Global connectivity is becoming risk-priced infrastructure, with providers paying — and charging — for the geography of subsea cable fragility.