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Iran blocks use of tool to get around Internet filter

(Reuters) - Iranian authorities have blocked the use of most “virtual private networks”, a tool that many Iranians use to get around an extensive government Internet filter, Iranian media quoted an official as saying on Sunday.

Reuters Yeganeh Torbati

Context & Ripple Effects

Iran had already combined destination-level censorship with plans for a domestic Internet system in 2012, alongside the blocking of Google. The earlier block on the U.S. virtual embassy showed that official foreign information channels were also within the filter’s reach.

Restricting the main workaround changes the enforcement model: Iran’s established filter is no longer limited to deciding which sites can be reached, but reaches toward the tools users employ to bypass those decisions.

First-order effects

  • Iranians who relied on VPNs to bypass Iran’s government Internet filter face a reduced ability to reach blocked services and information.
  • Iranian authorities extend censorship enforcement from blocking individual destinations to constraining a commonly used access method.

Second-order effects

  • The planned domestic Internet system becomes more consequential for Iranian users as access to services outside the state-controlled network is harder to circumvent.
  • Foreign public-information channels already subject to Iran’s filter, including the U.S. virtual embassy, become less accessible to users who had depended on VPNs to reach them.

Third-order effects

  • If Iran continues pairing domestic-network development with restrictions on circumvention tools, Internet control shifts from a site-by-site filter toward control over the routes users take online.
  • The pattern puts access-tool providers at the center of censorship enforcement, because restricting the bypass method can limit many blocked destinations at once.

The trend: Iran’s Internet policy is moving from blocking selected online destinations toward controlling both the network environment and the tools used to escape it.