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Chronicles

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After Deal Changes With Zynga, Facebook Could Now Make Its Own Games

Could Facebook delve into the game-making business?  —  According to documents filed with the SEC, it's possible.  —  Facebook and gaming giant Zynga revised their long-standing contract agreements on Thursday …

AllThingsD Mike Isaac

Context & Ripple Effects

The relationship this filing revises was once openly adversarial: back in 2010 Zynga was reportedly building Zynga Live, a rival network meant to break its dependence on Facebook's platform. Since then the leverage has shifted — Zynga confirmed in early 2012 it was seeking partners for online gambling initiatives, a business it would want freedom to run outside Facebook's rules.

Thursday's SEC filing confirms the two companies formally rewrote those long-standing contracts, and syndicated reporting from TechCrunch through the BBC indicates the new terms drop Zynga's ties to Facebook Credits, Facebook ad units, and exclusivity. The rumor surfaced in the same documents: nothing may now stop Facebook itself from developing and publishing games on its own platform.

First-order effects

  • Zynga gains immediate commercial freedom — it can route payments, advertising, and distribution through channels other than Facebook, ending the credits-and-exclusivity arrangement that defined the partnership since its $5-billion-era heyday.
  • Facebook acquires the contractual right to become a first-party game maker, turning it from neutral platform operator into a potential direct competitor of every studio on its canvas, Zynga above all.

Second-order effects

  • Other large Facebook game developers will press for the same carve-outs Zynga just won, eroding the take-rate economics Facebook's games business was built on.
  • Zynga's diversification push — including its stated gambling ambitions — gets easier to execute off-platform, weakening the traffic-for-exclusivity trade that once bound the two companies together.

Third-order effects

  • If the pattern holds, social platforms stop buying developer loyalty with exclusivity and start competing with their own ecosystems — a structural shift in which the platform's first-party content, not contracted supply, becomes the margin story.
  • The episode also marks the maturation of social gaming from a land-grab phase, where lock-ins made sense, to an open-distribution phase where the biggest developers hold enough audience of their own to negotiate as equals.

The trend: Social-gaming platforms are unwinding exclusive developer lock-ins as their largest partners gain independent distribution — leaving the platform free to compete first-party.