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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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Researcher uses NFC to attack Android, Nokia smartphones

Expert finds flaws in NFC implementations in Android and Nokia that could be used to compromise smartphones.  —  Follow @elinormills  —  Charlie Miller demonstrates at Black Hat 2012 how an ostensibly innocuous NFC sticker …

CNET Elinor Mills

Context & Ripple Effects

Charlie Miller's Black Hat 2012 demonstration lands mid-way through a rough stretch for Android security: researchers had already shown in December 2011 how data leaks in pre-installed Android apps exposed users without any action on their part, and Miller's NFC sticker attack extends that pattern from software bundled on the phone to the radio hardware itself. The pickup list — Reuters, The Verge, Computerworld, VentureBeat — shows the story travelled well beyond the security press.

For Nokia the timing is awkward. The company spent June and July 2012 talking up its rebuild — PureView coming to Lumia, Lumia heading to Sprint and Verizon — and an NFC implementation flaw in its smartphones hands critics a fresh line of attack just as it fights to re-enter the US market.

First-order effects

  • Google and Nokia face immediate pressure to ship fixes for their NFC stacks, since Miller showed a passive sticker alone can compromise a phone whose owner merely brings it near the tag.
  • Every handset maker shipping NFC hardware in 2012 inherits the scrutiny: the attack targets the implementations, not one vendor's code, so the whole NFC-enabled lineup is under question at once.

Second-order effects

  • NFC's commercial pitch in 2012 is contactless payment, and a demonstrated remote-compromise vector gives carriers, banks, and payment partners a concrete reason to slow wallet rollouts or demand hardened stacks before tying accounts to the radio.
  • Security researchers get a validated playbook: Miller's talk signals that short-range radios are under-examined, inviting follow-on work against Bluetooth, RFID, and other proximity interfaces across all vendors.

Third-order effects

  • If the pattern holds, proximity radios become a standing attack surface class alongside browsers and basebands, forcing platform vendors to treat NFC firmware as patchable, auditable code rather than a set-and-forget component.
  • Conference-driven disclosure of this kind pushes vendors toward faster coordinated patch cycles for hardware-adjacent flaws, since public demos leave unpatched fleets exposed until updates land.

The trend: As phones turn into wallets, the short-range radios that enable tap-to-pay are shifting from convenience features to prime targets for security researchers and attackers alike.