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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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A Fight in Silicon Valley: Founders Push for Control

There's a power struggle underway in Silicon Valley.  At stake: Power itself.  —  Over the past two years, one of the most influential venture-capital firms has turned the usual rules of start-up investing on its head.

Wall Street Journal

Context & Ripple Effects

This story lands at the end of a four-year swing in leverage. In March 2008, VCs were still pushing back against founder-driven rating site TheFunded; by March 2011 the Journal was reporting that founders had gained real clout in deal negotiations. What changed by mid-2012 is that one of the most influential firms stopped merely conceding founder-friendly terms and rebuilt its investing model around them, turning standard term-sheet economics upside down.

The backdrop matters: GigaOM reported in September 2011 that VCs themselves expected a shakeout among seed-funded startups, meaning capital was chasing fewer credible winners. When money competes hard for scarce hot deals, the scarce party — the founder — sets the terms.

First-order effects

  • Founders at sought-after startups can now negotiate control provisions — board composition, voting rights, protective terms — that were non-standard when VCs held the pricing power.
  • Rival venture firms face a matching problem: adopt comparable founder-friendly structures or lose access to the best deals to the firm that set the new template.

Second-order effects

  • Competition for scarce winners pushes valuations and terms further in founders' favor, compressing returns for funds that overpay for access and squeezing the middle tier of firms least able to win either price or relationships.
  • Limited partners inherit the trade-off: funds buying growth by ceding governance are taking on portfolio risk with weaker oversight levers than the traditional model provided.

Third-order effects

  • If founder-favoring terms become the default rather than the exception, Silicon Valley's governance norm inverts — boards and control rights are structured around retaining founders, and the VC's role shifts from gatekeeper to service provider competing on network and brand.
  • That inversion raises the stakes of the predicted seed shakeout: a market where capital is abundant but discipline is thin tends to consolidate around a few firms whose reputations substitute for the control rights they gave up.

The trend: Venture capital is moving from a seller's market run by investors to a buyer's market run by founders, with each firm's concession resetting the floor for everyone else.