Don't Be Too Disappointed By Google Music's Lackluster Debut
The web is less than enthused by Google Music, which made its debut today with the usual fanfare. The criticism is withering in its somewhat entitled way: “Where's the Spotify killer?” “Rdio already does this!” “So it's basically iTunes match?”
Context & Ripple Effects
This debut closes a two-year arc of fits and starts: speculation dating back to 2009 (what if Google built a music service), label talks that went "backwards" by April 2011 (label talks going backwards), and a May 2011 beta that reviewers found miserable — so weak that by August Google was running a music blog largely to remind people the beta existed.
The launch itself was telegraphed days ago as shipping without all the music, and the pickup across GigaOM, The Verge, Search Engine Land and Google's own blog confirms the shape: a store plus locker, Google+ sharing, and an indie artist hub, with EMI and Sony aboard. The web's shrug is less about the product than about the bar its rivals set — Spotify rode a Facebook partnership into the fall while posting heavy losses, and Rdio dropped a free ad-free tier for US users just six weeks before this launch.
First-order effects
- Google Music enters the market on day one as a follower: critics immediately benchmark it against Spotify, Rdio, and iTunes Match rather than judging it on its own store-and-locker terms.
- Indie artists gain a direct distribution and promotional channel through the artist hub and Google+ song-sharing, giving unsigned acts shelf space at a major-platform launch.
Second-order effects
- Rdio and Spotify are forced to compete on Google's home turf — Android distribution and search reach — while their own recent moves (Rdio's free tier, Spotify's Facebook integration) become the feature checklist Google is now expected to match.
- Labels that held out of the launch, notably the majors not named EMI or Sony in the launch coverage, gain leverage: every future negotiation now happens against a live Google service visibly missing catalog.
Third-order effects
- If the pattern holds, the US digital music market splits structurally between download-store/locker hybrids and subscription streaming, forcing every entrant to license full catalogs before launch — which concentrates power further in the hands of the remaining unlicensed labels.
- Social-graph music discovery (Spotify-via-Facebook, Google-via-Google+) becomes the default battleground, making platform owners rather than music services the gatekeepers of listening habits.
The trend: Digital music is consolidating around subscription streaming and social sharing, with catalog licensing deals — not features — determining which platforms can compete at launch.