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Apple Laptops Vulnerable To Hack That Kills Or Corrupts Batteries

A pile of dead Apple laptop batteries, victims of Charlie Miller's research.  —  Your laptop's battery is smarter than it looks.  And if a hacker like security researcher Charlie Miller gets his digital hands on it, it could become more evil than it appears, too.

The Firewall Andy Greenberg

Context & Ripple Effects

This is the third act in a long-running arc of Mac-focused security work. The 2006 MacBook Wi-Fi hack showed Apple's wireless stack could be reached without touching its own drivers, and a December 2007 Financial Times piece flagged that Apple's rising popularity was luring hackers as the Mac installed base grew.

Charlie Miller's battery demonstration moves the attack surface again: past the operating system and peripherals, down into the smart battery's own embedded firmware. It matters because a compromised battery controller sits below most of the software defenses users and Apple rely on.

First-order effects

  • Owners of Apple laptops face a demonstrated risk that their batteries can be remotely killed or corrupted, with no user-visible warning before failure.
  • Apple must treat battery-controller firmware as an attack surface it has to defend — patching, locking, or signing code on a component it previously treated as dumb hardware.

Second-order effects

  • Security researchers will likely follow Miller's lead into other embedded controllers inside laptops, forcing Apple and PC makers to audit components they buy rather than build.
  • Battery and component suppliers come under pressure from customers like Apple for authenticated, signed firmware — shifting security responsibility upstream into the hardware supply chain.

Third-order effects

  • If firmware-level attacks keep proving feasible, platform security shifts toward hardware root-of-trust models where every embedded chip verifies its own code — a structural change in how consumer devices are designed and certified.
  • The pattern reinforces the researcher-disclosure dynamic: independent demonstrations like this one become the de facto driver of firmware security policy at device makers.

The trend: As the Mac installed base grows, attackers and researchers are pushing below the OS into embedded firmware, turning previously ignored components like batteries into a security battleground.