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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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The Trouble with Nathan Myhrvold's Pro-Patent Arguments

Nathan Myhrvold is a smart guy.  I haven't met him, but everyone tells me that, so I'll take it as given.  I have a hunch he's 1980s Microsoft-smart, which is to say he's about as much fun to be with as a talking Wikipedia page, but hey, some people like that.

Paul Kedrosky's Infectious Greed Paul Kedrosky

Context & Ripple Effects

Nathan Myhrvold's patent-fund experiment has been contested territory since at least November 2008, when Techdirt asked whether Bill Gates' next act would be patent-trolling for Myhrvold — framing the fund not as an invention engine but as an aggregator pressing others for license fees.

That frame resurfaces in this July 2011 exchange: Bloomberg carries Myhrvold's argument that tech giants have discovered patents' value, and Paul Kedrosky pushes back on the reasoning itself rather than the personality. The significance is that the critique has moved from gadget-blog mockery toward mainstream business outlets debating whether buying patents at scale creates value or just tolls.

First-order effects

  • Myhrvold's fund gains its most valuable validation yet — blue-chip tech companies treating patents as an asset class worth paying for — while Kedrosky's rebuttal gives skeptics a citable counterargument in the same news cycle.
  • Large technology firms weighing patent purchases now face a public argument that the 'value' being discovered is transfer pricing among incumbents, not new invention.

Second-order effects

  • If incumbents keep buying into the patent market, smaller software companies inherit higher licensing and litigation exposure, since aggregated portfolios get enforced against the whole field, not just rival giants.
  • Rivals and critics of the aggregation model gain a rhetorical opening: every mainstream airing of Myhrvold's case invites scrutiny of whether his funds' returns come from innovation or from leverage.

Third-order effects

  • The episode marks patents drifting from an incentive for inventors toward a tradable financial instrument managed by intermediaries — a shift that, if it holds, forces policymakers to choose between protecting portfolio owners and lowering barriers for operating companies.
  • A durable fault line opens in Silicon Valley between firms that can afford defensive patent war chests and those priced out of the market entirely.

The trend: High-tech patents are becoming a financialized asset class run through intermediaries like Myhrvold's funds, turning patent policy from an inventor-side question into a market-structure fight.