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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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Iran Plans to Unplug Internet, Create Its Own

Iran is waging war on open Internet.  Looking to limit the cyber-infiltration of Western ideas, Iran's telecommunications chief claimed that, in two years time, all Iranians would be forced to use a state-censored, fully-internal Internet.

Newser Luke Kelly-Clyne

Context & Ripple Effects

This announcement reaches our file as a standalone report on 2011-05-28, with no earlier build-up covered and no syndicated pickups recorded, so its immediate footprint appears narrow even though the claim behind it is large. The substance rests on two confirmed statements: that Iran is treating open Internet access as a channel for Western influence, and that the telecommunications chief expects all Iranians to be moved onto a state-censored, fully internal network within roughly two years.

First-order effects

  • If the stated timetable holds through 2013, Iranian users and businesses lose direct reach to foreign-hosted sites and services, with every connection routed through state-controlled infrastructure instead.
  • Iran's telecommunications apparatus shifts from filtering traffic to replacing it — becoming the operator, host, and censor of the country's entire online environment at once.

Second-order effects

  • Foreign web operators face a choice between building compliant domestic presences inside Iran's network or losing the Iranian audience outright, since access will exist only on the state's terms.
  • Demand for circumvention tools and proxy access rises among Iranians who want uncensored content, making the border between the national intranet and the open web the main contested layer rather than individual blocked sites.

Third-order effects

  • A functioning national intranet would give other governments a working template for 'network sovereignty' — control achieved not by blocking pages but by owning the whole stack beneath them.
  • The global internet fragments further into jurisdiction-bounded networks, pressuring international norms on cross-border data flows and giving states leverage over which foreign services may operate at all.

The trend: State control of the internet is moving from filtering external content toward replacing the open web with sovereign national networks — Iran's two-year intranet pledge is an early, explicit statement of that model.