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Chronicles

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Ballmer to Hu: 90% of Microsoft customers in China using pirated software

Microsoft CEO raises concerns to Chinese president about intellectual property protection  —  While Chinese President Hu Jintao knew he'd face some tough questions when he came to the United States this week …

Network World Jon Brodkin

Context & Ripple Effects

Steve Ballmer has form here: a year earlier he publicly criticized Google over its China stance, positioning Microsoft as willing to talk bluntly about doing business in China while rivals pulled back. The piracy numbers themselves have been on the record since at least 2007, when an industry study put worldwide software piracy losses around $40 billion a year.

What changes with this story is venue and specificity: during Hu Jintao's state visit to Washington, with IP protection already a friction point between the two governments, Ballmer puts a concrete figure — nine in ten Microsoft customers in China running pirated software — directly to the Chinese president rather than leaving it in trade-association studies.

First-order effects

  • Hu Jintao leaves the meeting having heard from one of America's largest software vendors that its Chinese customer base is overwhelmingly unlicensed — a direct commercial complaint delivered at head-of-state level.
  • Microsoft converts a long-standing internal revenue problem into a public negotiating position, raising the cost for Chinese officials of treating piracy as a purely domestic matter.

Second-order effects

  • Other US intellectual-property holders gain a template for escalating their own China complaints by attaching them to high-visibility diplomatic moments rather than waiting on trade negotiations.
  • Beijing faces pressure to show enforcement progress, since repeated public quantification of losses gives US trade negotiators a concrete grievance to carry into bilateral talks.

Third-order effects

  • If piracy figures keep migrating from industry studies into head-of-state meetings, IP protection hardens into a standing pillar of US–China economic diplomacy alongside currency and market access.
  • For software vendors operating in markets where most users don't pay, the durable question shifts from enforcement alone to business models that can monetize near-zero-license markets.

The trend: Software piracy is moving from annual industry-loss studies to the top of the bilateral agenda, with vendor CEOs naming figures directly to Chinese leadership.