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Worm uses QuickTime to spread on MySpace

update A malicious video on MySpace.com pages changes people's profiles when played, embedding itself and adding links to fraudulent Web sites, experts have warned.  —  The video is a rigged QuickTime file that exploits a MySpace vulnerability …

CNET News.com Joris Evers

Context & Ripple Effects

MySpace's scale has made it a repeated target rather than an occasional one: in July 2006, a hacked banner ad served spyware to roughly a million visitors, showing that anything third-party rendered onto a profile page is attack surface. The new twist here is that the payload is not bought or injected through the ad system — it is an ordinary-looking QuickTime video uploaded by the attacker, which rewrites the viewer's own profile once played.

That matters because it turns every viewer into a distributor. The confirmed mechanics — profile alteration, self-embedding, and links out to fraudulent Web sites — make this a profile-to-profile worm riding user-generated content, not a one-shot defacement.

First-order effects

  • Users who play the rigged QuickTime file have their profiles rewritten without consent, seeding the worm further and pointing their friends at fraudulent Web sites.
  • MySpace is under immediate pressure to close the underlying vulnerability and strip malicious embeds from member pages, since its open embedding model is the delivery mechanism.

Second-order effects

  • The incident forces social networks and the sites hosting embeddable media to treat uploaded video as untrusted input, pushing sanitization of media metadata and player behavior up the priority list.
  • Advertisers and labels using rich media on MySpace face brand-safety risk by association, since viewers cannot easily distinguish legitimate embeds from rigged ones.

Third-order effects

  • If the pattern holds, worm propagation migrates from email attachments toward social-graph distribution, where each infected profile is a trusted sender and containment depends on platform-side filtering rather than user caution.
  • Media players like QuickTime become part of the Web attack surface, raising the stakes for how desktop software handles files fetched by social sites.

The trend: Social-network attacks are shifting from purchased ad placements to self-propagating payloads hidden inside user-uploaded media, making the embed pipeline itself the battleground.