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Microsoft's OneCare firewall draws fire

The firewall component in Microsoft's Windows OneCare security bundle has holes, experts have warned.  —  The security software, available in a public beta version, by default allows applications that use the Java Virtual Machine or have a digital signature to connect to the Internet.

CNET News.com Joris Evers

Context & Ripple Effects

This lands two fronts into the same fight. In late December 2005, Microsoft was already dealing with a Windows vulnerability rated “severe”; now, with OneCare in public beta, experts flag that the bundle’s firewall quietly trusts any application carrying a digital signature or running inside the Java Virtual Machine — so qualifying malware connects to the Internet without ever prompting the user.

First-order effects

  • Beta testers get protection thinner than the firewall implies: the default allowlist waves through signed programs and JVM-hosted applications, so the prompt-based defense users think they have doesn’t exist for whole classes of software.
  • Microsoft has to rework the default policy while OneCare is still in beta, because every beta install is now a public exhibit of the gap the experts describe.

Second-order effects

  • Since the bypass hinges on digital signatures, signing credentials become a firewall passkey — raising the stakes on whoever issues certificates and making code-signing infrastructure part of the attack surface whether issuers planned for it or not.
  • The warning reinforces a broader critique running through this period of Microsoft consumer software: commentary on the IE7 beta’s installation fine print flags the same pattern of permissive defaults granting broad rights unless users actively opt out, turning individual bugs into a question about how Microsoft designs defaults across products.

Third-order effects

  • If trust-on-sight for signed code hardens into standard firewall design, enforcement migrates upstream to the signature system itself — the choke point shifts from detecting bad behavior to deciding whose vouching counts, a structural dependency most endpoint vendors haven’t had to price in before.
  • And because the OS vendor is now selling the security layer, defects in that layer compound: the company defending the platform and the company widening its attack surface are the same one, a conflict independent testers and eventually regulators would be positioned to probe.

The trend: Consumer security is migrating from third-party suites toward trust decisions made by the OS vendor itself, moving the battleground from detection engines to what code a platform decides to let through by default.