Sources: the UK Royal Navy removed internet connectivity from its drones' cameras, after finding they sent “heartbeat communications” to an IP address in China
Special forces boats set for use in planned Gulf missions were fitted with Chinese-made components
TelegraphRichard Holmes
Context & Ripple Effects
The Royal Navy’s response echoes an earlier push for drones to operate offline after the US Army stopped using DJI over cyber-vulnerability concerns. Here, the issue is not merely a supplier’s country of origin but outbound communications detected from camera-equipped drones on boats intended for Gulf missions.
The UK is also expanding access to purpose-built military communications through its use of Starshield. That makes the separation between trusted operational networks and unvetted device telemetry a more immediate defence-procurement concern.
First-order effects
Royal Navy operators lose internet connectivity from the affected drone cameras, removing the detected communications path to the Chinese IP address.
Chinese-made components fitted to the special-forces boats become a direct security-review issue for the Navy’s Gulf mission equipment.
Second-order effects
UK defence buyers will have to treat device telemetry and network behavior, rather than component origin alone, as criteria when approving connected cameras and drones.
Suppliers of drone and camera systems for military use face pressure to support isolated operation and provide clearer control over where their equipment communicates.
Third-order effects
If this pattern persists, defence drone procurement will increasingly favor systems whose sensors, software, and communications can be independently segmented and verified before deployment.
Military adoption of dedicated communications infrastructure, alongside tighter scrutiny of connected components, points toward a more fragmented market for trusted versus untrusted drone subsystems.
The trend: Defence users are moving from supply-chain screening alone toward operational verification of the network behavior embedded in connected equipment.
Unnaceptable tech dependency? Spyware has been far too close for comfort. QED. — The latest vulnerability discovered in a Kraken uncrewed vessel is not a one-off glitch. …
This seems incredibly stupid to allow these things access to the internet at all, and no one caught this in prototyping? Just major screwups and incompetence all around 💯🥴
Royal Navy spy drones used by Britain's elite special forces secretly sent data to China, The Telegraph can reveal. https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ ... The cameras on the K3 Scout surveillance drones had components made in China which were transmitting information to a device in the…
Serious questions for the Ministry of Defence, Royal Navy and Kraken Technology Group about the use of internet connected Chinese components in the K3 Scout and Project Beehive. A ridiculous oversight that prompts concerns about the presence of Chinese technology across the MOD. …
> The drones were supplied by a major British defence contractor, Kraken Technology Group, which sourced the cameras from a third party I wonder if Project Replicator and other anti-Chyna sci-fi Anglo initiatives with izzated names have the same Achilles heel
Huge story. Beggars belief that, after more than six years of non-stop CCP belligerence, cyber attacks, and espionage, UK armed forces are still buying from an adversary state like China (with all the risks). Insanity. Paging @wesstreeting
It would be super profitable to set up a local assembly chip company, buy the sheets from Taiwan and have a clean room where they are checked and assembled here. Youd get every single defence contract. They do it in the US and we can sometimes get on that supply chain but then
Just FYI, I have written about how China embeds electronics in small weapons and other physical military assets and yes around the world. I have the data. Literally, I tell you guys what will come out in a few years and nobody listens
NEW: Royal Navy sea drones secretly sent data to China. Cameras onboard a fleet of surveillance drones were found to contain Chinese parts despite assurances from suppliers that they were secure. An investigation found the cameras had been sending “heartbeat” signals to an
Great start to the Hybrid Navy. Six years on from banning Huawei has the UK government learned nothing? They clearly have not. Embarrassing. Spy cameras on Navy drones secretly sent data to China https://www.telegraph.co.uk/ ...
And no one thought to check this out from the beginning of the procurement process through to operational deployment? Honestly, we don't deserve this level of incompetence. Why bother with a government at all. Utter and complete incompetence from top to bottom. I bet it was one
Military drones in the UK were contacting servers in China. All Chinese technology spies for the CCP. If a drone has a bunch of chips from China, it cannot be trusted in combat. The thing will either transmit coordinates to the PLA or even turn traitor. 🔗 [image]
If anyone asks why we can't just use someone else's drones or tech, this is why. No, we're not buying Chinese drones for one way attack. No, we're not having foreign shipyards build our warships.
Its an occupational hazard when buying COTS that some modifications are needed after purchase. Chinese domination of the commercial digital camera market is a problem which needs addressing by manufacturers. At least it was quicky identified and resolved. https://www.telegraph.co…