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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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How the rapid rise in US- and China-made AI model abilities is leading to both a transformation in AI use at work, and sudden lurches in policies and markets

How work changes along the exponential  —  If you feel like things are accelerating in AI, you are probably right.

One Useful Thing Ethan Mollick

Context & Ripple Effects

Related coverage has tracked a sharp acceleration in frontier-model releases since late 2024, alongside a widening debate over what increasingly capable systems mean for work rather than merely for technical benchmarks.

The arc has also become geopolitical: the AI Index coverage says the US–China model gap has narrowed, while China-focused reporting highlights the tension between productivity gains and labor displacement. This story connects those capability shifts to workplace adoption and faster reactions from policymakers and markets.

First-order effects

  • Employers and knowledge workers face more frequent workflow changes as stronger US- and China-made models make a broader set of tasks practical to automate or augment.
  • Policy and market participants must reprice expectations more abruptly when model capability gains change assumptions about which firms, skills, or sectors benefit from AI.

Second-order effects

  • AI vendors and enterprise software providers are pushed to shorten product cycles and demonstrate concrete workplace value, as model advances can quickly reset the competitive baseline.
  • Labor-policy debates become harder to defer: productivity upside and displacement risk move together, particularly in the China-related coverage's framing of automation as a potential economic risk.

Third-order effects

  • If capability gains continue to arrive in discontinuous-looking jumps, firms and governments will need adaptation systems that can be revised faster than traditional multiyear workforce and regulatory planning cycles.
  • A narrowing US–China capability gap would make AI diffusion less dependent on a single national supplier base, while increasing the importance of how each market manages deployment, investment, and labor adjustment.

The trend: AI is shifting from a steadily improving software category to a geopolitically distributed general-purpose technology whose capability jumps increasingly drive workplace reorganization and policy repricing.

Discussion

  • @emollick Ethan Mollick on bluesky
    I wrote about how the rapid rise in AI abilities is leading to both a transformation in how AI is used at work, and the sort of sudden lurches in policies and markets we have been seeing in recent weeks. open.substack.com/pub/oneusefu...