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Chronicles

The story behind the story

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An in-depth look at Russia's offensive cyber capabilities, their potential use in Ukraine, the limitations of cyber power, and implications for the West

Lawfare Ciaran Martin

Context & Ripple Effects

Lawfare's assessment ran two days before the invasion, cataloguing an offensive apparatus that had been building for years — the same campaign tied to earlier attacks on the Polish stock exchange and a German steel plant — while arguing that cyber power has hard strategic limits.

What followed split the difference: weeks in, Foreign Affairs rated cyberattacks on government, military, logistics, and critical infrastructure as Russia's biggest military success of the war so far, yet a quiet partnership between US tech companies, NATO intelligence agencies, and Ukrainian hackers kept the offensive from proving decisive — precisely the constraint this analysis flagged.

First-order effects

  • For Ukraine and NATO planners, the piece lands as a pre-war targeting preview: Russia's espionage-grade footholds in government, military, logistics, and infrastructure networks make those systems the first targets once hostilities begin.
  • It also hands Western policymakers a caution rooted in the analysis itself — cyber operations complement but cannot substitute for kinetic force, tempering any expectation that digital retaliation alone could deter the invasion.

Second-order effects

  • Once the invasion confirms the threat, the old restraint against hacking Russian targets dissolves and the country is hit by an unprecedented wave of retaliatory cyberattacks, ending its prior off-limits status.
  • US tech companies, NATO intelligence agencies, and Ukrainian hackers form a defensive partnership that blunts Russia's offensive capabilities, turning private-sector visibility into a military asset mid-conflict.

Third-order effects

  • A year in, Ukraine and its allies mount an unprecedented cyberdefense against Russian wiper malware even as observers credit Moscow's cyber campaign as its best-performing military effort — evidence that offensive cyber power excels at disruption but cannot decide wars.
  • If the pattern holds, wartime cyber conflict structurally favors federated defense — states, companies, and volunteer hackers sharing telemetry in real time — and the pre-war assumption that offensive cyber dominance converts into strategic leverage weakens across Western planning.

The trend: Great-power cyber conflict is shifting from covert, deniable espionage campaigns toward open wartime operations whose effectiveness depends less on offensive capability than on how quickly defenders federate.

Discussion

  • @ciaranmartinoxf Ciaran Martin on x
    Cyber & the war. My thoughts in ⁦@lawfareblog⁩ on: - unexpectedly low cyber activity so far; - high ongoing risk of cyber harassment & disruption against Ukraine & the west; - the limitations of cyber power; - implications for Western cyber posture. https://www.lawfareblog.com/ .…
  • @elisabethbraw Elisabeth Braw on x
    It's always welcome when a true expert evaluates a thorny situation - such as Russia's (limited use of) cyber aggression in the current war against Ukraine. @ciaranmartinoxf's article on the subject is a must-read: https://www.lawfareblog.com/ ...
  • @gordoncorera Gordon Corera on x
    “It turns out that the next war was not fought in cyberspace after all.” - @ciaranmartinoxf looks at the relatively low level of military-linked cyber activity so far. My guess is that when shooting starts, the traditional military men in Moscow elbow aside the cyber operators. h…
  • @brettcallow Brett Callow on x
    This comment from BoJo certainly hasn't aged well. Typically excellent insights from @ciaranmartinoxf https://www.lawfareblog.com/ ... https://twitter.com/...
  • @howelloneill Patrick Howell O'Neill on x
    There are a lot of smart people thinking hard about what's (not) going on with cyber and the Ukraine war. Just keep in mind it's a lot of (often highly educated) guessing. We don't know why this place that's been a highly active testbed looks quiet during a hot war. https://twitt…
  • @kevincollier Kevin Collier on x
    We still know so little about whether the pro-Ukraine “IT army” of hacktivists has done anything of consequence. No firm evidence, but that's not conclusive. Russian cyber companies who'd defend this are ducking comment. A big ol ¯\_(ツ)_/¯ as we wait. https://www.bloomberg.com/..…
  • @lzxdc Lauren Zabierek on x
    “To point out the misrepresentation of cyber capabilities, their limitations, & the lack of use of them so far in the conflict is to invite allegations of complacency. It should not; a nuanced understanding of the actual risks makes for better preparation for them.”