Researchers detail a BLE relay attack to unlock and operate a Tesla outside its BLE range; when told in April, Tesla said relay attacks are a “known limitation”
Context & Ripple Effects
The Tesla finding sits in a longer record of relay and key-system weaknesses: researchers had already shown that radio amplification could extend key-fob range across 24 vehicles from 19 manufacturers, while later work demonstrated a simple relay attack against a Model 3’s ultra-wideband keyless system.
Tesla’s characterization of relay attacks as a known limitation matters because the reported attack reaches beyond unlocking to operating the vehicle. It also follows prior Tesla security research, including the patched lane-marking attack on Autopilot, that put vehicle controls rather than only infotainment functions in scope.
First-order effects
- Tesla owners using BLE-based access face a theft and unauthorized-operation risk when an attacker can relay the phone-to-car signal beyond its intended range.
- Tesla is put on notice that treating relay attacks as an inherent limitation leaves the affected access workflow exposed rather than resolving the researchers’ reported path.
Second-order effects
- Other automakers using phone-based or proximity keys face renewed pressure to distinguish relay-resistant access designs from systems whose nominal wireless range can be extended; the earlier cross-manufacturer radio-amplification findings show the issue is not Tesla-specific.
- Security vendors and vehicle buyers gain a clearer reason to evaluate keyless systems by whether they resist relays, not merely by whether they replace physical keys with BLE or ultra-wideband.
Third-order effects
- If proximity credentials continue to authorize both entry and vehicle operation, automotive security will increasingly treat identity verification as a safety boundary with an expanding operational blast radius.
- The recurring findings point toward competition over relay-resistant vehicle access, with the practical security of an implementation carrying more weight than the wireless protocol named in its feature list.
The trend: Connected-car access is shifting from a convenience feature to a high-consequence control plane, making relay resistance a core test of automotive security design.