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Google agrees to let Match Group offer alternative billing to Android users; the Tinder owner drops its request for a temporary restraining order against Google

Android Central Jay Bonggolto

Context & Ripple Effects

Match Group has been pushing against Google's Play Store billing cut for years — Tinder was already testing direct payments to dodge Google's 30% take back in 2019. This month it escalated to a full antitrust suit alleging Google abuses its power by forcing developers onto its billing system when it sued Google in early May.

The concession came fast: within weeks of filing, Google agreed to let Match offer alternative billing to Android users, and Match dropped its request for a temporary restraining order. It is an early, concrete crack in the mandatory-billing model — and the arc eventually ran all the way to a 2023 settlement committing Google to third-party billing options for Match.

First-order effects

  • Match Group can now route Android users around Google's billing system, directly attacking the 30% cut it has tried to avoid since its 2019 direct-payment tests, while dropping the TRO that threatened Google in court.
  • Google buys de-escalation on its own terms — conceding billing flexibility to one vocal plaintiff rather than litigating the monopoly question immediately.

Second-order effects

  • Every large Play Store developer now has a template: sue over mandatory billing, win bespoke concessions — putting pressure on Google to either extend alternative billing broadly or defend the carve-out case by case.
  • Other app store operators face the same challenge, since Match's suit reframed the 30% fee as an abuse-of-power issue rather than a cost of distribution.

Third-order effects

  • If bespoke concessions keep getting won through litigation, mandatory first-party billing erodes into negotiated billing — shifting app store economics from a fixed platform tax to a per-developer bargaining outcome.
  • The eventual Match settlement, with third-party billing implemented on a committed timeline, suggests the endpoint is formalized billing choice inside the Play Store rather than a return to exclusivity.

The trend: App store payment exclusivity is being dismantled developer by developer, as litigation forces platform owners to trade mandatory billing cuts for individually negotiated alternatives.

Discussion

  • @randypicker Randy Picker on x
    Is hard to understand why this wasn't the deal struck up front by Epic with Apple and Google. Everyone here is good for the money, so the escrow almost seems like icing, but this type of deal keeps the properties on the platforms while the legal system sorts things. https://twitt…