A look at China's vision for semiconductor self-reliance, which has faced a series of issues after heavy investment, resulting in several investigations
New York Times
Context & Ripple Effects
Beijing's chip self-reliance campaign is being audited by its own government: the corruption probes opened in July 2022 into top semiconductor executives mark the moment the 'gold rush' phase of state investment gave way to accountability for where the money went. The coverage frames this as a rethink, not an abandonment.
Executives at Chinese chip firms and investment vehicles now face active corruption investigations, putting named leadership and ongoing project approvals under direct regulatory scrutiny.
Beijing's funding agencies must justify past disbursements, shifting the program's near-term focus from awarding new subsidies to auditing results of the heavy investment already spent.
Second-order effects
Slower, more scrutinized capital deployment pushes domestic chipmakers toward the localization path already visible in the coverage — cutting US tools and sourcing domestically, which helped make China 33% of global chip equipment sales by 2023 per SEMI.
Third-order effects
If the pattern holds, China's chip program consolidates around fewer, better-governed national champions rather than broad subsidy spray — echoing the 1960s lesson in the related coverage that political interference and scattered industrial strategy, not lack of money, cost China its earlier lead.
The trend: State-led semiconductor self-reliance programs are entering an accountability phase, where continued massive investment depends on demonstrating execution rather than announcing capacity.
My latest on why the latest investigations in the semiconductor industry revealed the tension between Xi's inward and backward vision for tech self-reliance in China and the very nature of semiconductors. https://www.nytimes.com/...
Excellent reporting by @LiYuan6 in this @nytimes article about how China's goal to catch up with the US on semiconductor technology is, so far, fraught with internal problems: https://www.nytimes.com/...
Fascinating read. Headline says China. But the article lays out how globally integrated ALL our lives are. As military tensions rise, the semiconductor tech we all use daily relies on fragile linkage of US, the Netherlands, China, Taiwan and South Korea. https://www.nytimes.com/.…
How China's planned economy works: “In... 2020, more than 58,000 firms registered as chip-related enterprises. Some... used to be in fashion, construction... and changed their registration information only to gain access to easy money.” https://www.nytimes.com/...
Interesting, by @LiYuan6. My Q though: if the very nature of semi-conductors makes self-reliance an elusive goal, that's not just true (and frustrating) for China, but presumably would be for the US too, right? https://www.nytimes.com/...
After heavy national investment in semiconductors to break a dependence on global chips, Chinese leader Xi Jinping seems unhappy with the results https://www.nytimes.com/... https://twitter.com/...
After China's heavy investment in semiconductors to break a dependence on global chips, corruption investigations in the industry “suggest that Mr. Xi may not be getting what he expected, or at least not quickly enough,” our columnist @LiYuan6 writes. https://www.nytimes.com/...
Yes, governments can't plan for either self-reliance or global domination in high tech sectors, no matter how much money they throw at it. Amusing when Western commentators would never say this works for US or allies but think China can plan to dominance. https://www.nytimes.com/…