US v. Google: Microsoft says the company has tried for years to displace Google as the iPhone's default search engine, but Apple never seriously considered Bing
Context & Ripple Effects
The testimony sits within a record of repeated but unsuccessful alternatives to Google on Apple devices: Microsoft later explored selling Bing to Apple, while Apple also declined DuckDuckGo for Safari private browsing.
The commercial stakes are unusually clear in the related coverage: Google’s 2022 payment to remain Safari’s default tied default placement to a major Apple revenue stream, even as Apple’s executives later characterized Bing as an unacceptable substitute.
First-order effects
- Microsoft’s account makes Apple’s willingness to switch—not merely the size of a rival bid—a central question in assessing Google’s default-search position.
- Google gains evidence for the argument that its Safari placement reflects product preference as well as payments; Apple’s choice preserves the existing Google default in the period described.
Second-order effects
- A rival seeking iPhone search distribution must clear Apple’s quality and product-integration threshold, limiting the leverage of pricing offers alone.
- The record raises the value of default access for search competitors: without it, Bing and other challengers must rely more heavily on users actively changing settings.
Third-order effects
- If device makers continue to treat default search as a product-quality decision alongside a revenue decision, competition scrutiny will turn on whether rivals can realistically overcome both barriers.
- The episode points to route-share economics in which control of the browser or device gateway can matter as much as competing search engines’ underlying capability.
The trend: Search competition is increasingly shaped by who controls high-traffic defaults—and by whether those defaults can be contested on product merit, commercial terms, or both.